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Abstract
In the 2001 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 27% of households report simulta-
neously revolving significant credit card debt and holding sizeable amounts of liquid assets.
These consumers report paying, on average, a 14% interest rate on their debt, while earning
only 1 or 2% on their liquid deposit accounts. This phenomenon is known in the literature as
the “credit card debt puzzle.” In this paper, I pose and quantitatively evaluate the following
explanation for this puzzle: households that accumulate credit card debt may not pay it
off using their money in the bank, because they expect to use that money for goods for
which credit cards cannot be used. Using both aggregate and survey data (SCF and CEX),
I document that liquid assets are a substantial part of households’ portfolios and that con-
sumption in goods requiring liquid payments may have a sizeable unpredictable component.
This would warrant holding precautionary balances in liquid accounts. I develop a dynamic
heterogeneous-agent model of household portfolio choice, where households are subject to
uninsurable income and preference uncertainty, and consumer credit and liquidity coexist
as means of consumption and saving/borrowing. The calibration of the model parameters
is based on the simulated method of moments. The calibrated model accounts for 73% of
the households in the data who hold consumer debt and liquidity simultaneously, and for at
least 55 cents of every dollar held by a median household in the puzzle group. I argue that
these results are a lower bound, and that the liquidity-need hypothesis is thus successful in
rendering most of the puzzle a rational phenomenon.
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1 Introduction
In the 2001 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, 27% of households reported revolving an average
of $5,766 in credit card debt, with an APR of 14%, and simultaneously, holding an average of
$7,338 in liquid assets, with a return rate of around 1%. In fact, 84% of households who revolved
credit card debt had some liquid assets that could be, but were not, used for credit card debt
repayment. This apparent violation of the no-arbitrage condition has been termed the “credit
card debt puzzle”.
Gross and Souleles (2002) were among the first to document this fact. They suggested several
possible explanations for this behavior, two of which have been pursued in the literature since
then. Lehnert & Maki (2001) study whether households may do this strategically, in preparation
for a bankruptcy filing. Since in the U.S., each state offers some exemption level of assets in
the event of a household bankruptcy filing, the authors argue that households may run up their
credit card debt since it would be discharged during the filing, while keeping their assets in
liquid form, in order to convert them to exemptible assets when filing. The authors examine
exemption level by state, and find that in states where exemption levels are higher, the puzzle
is more prevalent. While this may be a compelling idea to a small number of households in
question, upon examination of the total portfolios of the puzzle households, it appears that
most of them would be unlikely to file for bankruptcy. I will present the relevant evidence
below.
Alternatively, Bertaut and Haliassos (2002), and Haliassos and Reiter (2003) have studied
whether households may opt to hold both liquidity and credit card debt simultaneously as a
means of self- (or spouse) control. If one spouse in the household is the earner, and the other is
the compulsive shopper, it is argued that the earner will choose not to pay off credit card debt
in full in order to leave less of the credit line open for the shopper to spend. This again may
apply to some small share of households, but is unlikely to account for many of the households
in the puzzle category, since it is a costly way of performing this kind of control. A household
in the puzzle group loses, on average, $734 per year, largely from the costs of debt revolving,
which amounts to 1.5% of their total annual after-tax income. Less expensive control options
are available, such as lowering the credit limit or holding fewer credit cards.
Laibson et al (2001) examine a related puzzle: the coexistence in household portfolios of
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credit card debt and retirement assets. The difference is key: retirement assets, such as IRA
accounts, are nonliquid and involve a significant penalty for early withdrawal. The authors
explain this behavior with time-inconsistent decision-making by households, which makes them
patient in the long run, but impatient in the short run. The explanation cannot apply to the
credit card debt puzzle, however, because the tradeoff here is between two short-run decisions,
and because liquid asset withdrawal does not incur a penalty, which makes the behavior more
puzzling still from this perspective.
Although the existing explanations for the credit card debt puzzle may have merit for some
households, there are seemingly many households whose behavior they are not likely to capture,
for reasons mentioned above. In this paper, I study in detail, for the first time, a hypothesis
of why a household may choose rationally to hold liquid assets and revolve credit card debt
simultaneously, and evaluate how much of the puzzle this hypothesis can account for. The
premise is that there are large parts of household monthly expenditures that cannot be paid for by
credit card, so they must be paid by liquid instruments.1 Such payments often are substantial in
size, and include predicted expenses (such as mortgage and rent payments, utilities, babysitting
and daycare services), as well as significant unpredictable ones (such as major household repairs,
auto repairs and other types of emergencies).2 Some of these are universally cash-only goods,
while others may or may not be. For example, large auto dealerships accept credit cards, but
smaller mechanics more trusted by households may not. All of these expenses warrant keeping
money in the bank. Thus, even for a household that has accumulated credit card debt, drawing
down its liquid assets below some threshold is not an optimal choice, and the household may
prioritize building its liquid asset holdings over debt repayment in the short to medium run.
The unpredictable nature of some of the expenditures requiring payment by a check, say, may
warrant holding fairly large liquid balances for precautionary reasons, as inability to pay if
emergency strikes may be very costly.
Gross and Souleles (2002) briefly mention this idea as a possibility but do not analyze it,
and indeed dismiss it as likely unimportant. A careful quantitative analysis of the hypothesis,
however, is an involved exercise, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, and it is
1I use the term “liquid assets” such as checks, debit cards and savings accounts, interchangeably with “money”
and “cash”, since their liquidity properties are the same for my purposes.
2Below, I discuss the survey evidence of the fact that such goods tend to be cash-only goods.
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crucial, because it allows us to evaluate the possibility that the “puzzle” is in fact a rational
phenomenon, at least for many households.
The goal of this paper is to measure how much of the puzzle the hypothesis presented here
can account for. Specifically, I answer the following two questions: (1) Can the need for liquidity
explain why so many households revolve debt while having money in the bank?; and (2) How
much liquidity is it optimal for a household to have, given the risk characteristics that it is
exposed to, especially if it revolves credit card debt?
I use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey to study characteristics of households who choose to borrow on credit cards and save in
liquid accounts simultaneously. I will show that there is nothing inherent about them, from
a demographic perspective, that would distinguish them from other households, so that the
phenomenon may have economic causes. I will also show evidence that gives support to the
importance of liquid assets in monthly household expenditures, and to the fact that uncertainty
in these expenditures appears to play a significant role.
Next, I develop a dynamic stochastic partial-equilibrium model of household portfolio choice,
in order to develop the intuition, and to study the hypothesis rigorously, both analytically and
quantitatively. The basis is a standard incomplete-market heterogeneous-agent model with two
types of idiosyncratic risk. The model’s novel features are a two-market structure, where in
one of the markets credit cannot be used, and the timing of the two risk realizations during
the period such that portfolio decisions have to be made before spending decisions. There is
also a restriction that while some of the spending decisions are made, no access to additional
income or portfolio rebalancing is allowed. In its treatment of money, the model is consistent
both with Lucas-Stokey-style cash-credit good models and with a more recent generation of
monetary models that treat the reasons for why money is essential in trade explicitly.3 As I
will show, the model has all the analytical implications important for addressing the credit card
debt puzzle.
3In a related theoretical exercise, Telyukova and Wright (2008) approach this puzzle as the rate-of-return
dominance puzzle and develop a micro-founded monetary model to analyze it. In that paper, the model we
develop treats explicitly the frictions that are needed to make both money and credit essential in an economy. In
the current paper, in contrast, my focus is on quantitative analysis using a heterogeneous-agent model of realistic
complexity - so I abstract from the reasons for why credit may be accepted in some markets, but not others, and
simply take this fact as given.
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I calibrate the model by matching it to properties of liquid-asset consumption and main
distributional characteristics in the data. It is crucial that I leave all properties of household
portfolio choice, as well as the numbers of people who choose different portfolios, untargeted
in the calibration, in order to be able to judge in a disciplined way how well the hypothesis
presented here does at explaining the puzzle. The calibration method is based on the simulated
method of moments, where I minimize the weighted squared distance between relevant moments
in the data and their simulated counterparts in the model. The calibrated model accounts for
73% of the households who choose to revolve debt while holding money in the bank, and for a
median such household, for at least 55 cents of every dollar it holds in liquid accounts.
The main contributions of this paper are three. First, I propose and carefully evaluate a new
answer to a still-unresolved puzzle, and find that it can account for the puzzle to a very significant
degree. Debt puzzles of this nature frequently lead the observer to wonder whether households
are capable of making rational decisions, while rationality is the most fundamental assumption
of the majority of economic theory. The implication of this work is that we need not question
rationality of at least most households in this context. Second, the need for liquidity arises in
this paper because liquid assets are the most versatile and sometimes the unique payment option
available. This mechanism then accounts for a much broader class of debt puzzles than just the
one having to do with credit card debt. The co-existence of any kind of debt and liquid assets
in a household portfolio could have the same explanation as the one presented here, and the
model may be useful in accounting for such portfolio allocation puzzles. Third, in the process,
I obtain estimates of some parameters of interest. Based on survey data, I measure one type of
unobservable idiosyncratic uncertainty that faces households in the context of a liquidity-based
model. I also obtain estimates of some preference parameters of interest - especially the elasticity
of substitution between cash and credit goods - that have only been estimated in deterministic
models until now. My estimates suggest that idiosyncratic uncertainty affects these parameter
estimates considerably.
In complimentary work, Zinman(2006) uses survey data to demonstrate, via some simple
calculations, that “borrowing high and lending low” is largely not puzzling and can be seen
as rational. His claim is that once one accounts for the liquidity premium of checking and
savings accounts, the return differential between the two assets is largely calculated away, and
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the puzzle stops being prevalent. Thus, Zinman’s findings provide informal support for the
formal treatment of the liquidity need hypothesis presented in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I characterize the credit card debt puzzle
in the data, by studying the Survey of Consumer Finances and Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Section 3 lays out the model and analyzes its properties. Section 4 discusses calibration and
computation. Section 5 presents the results from the calibrated model, and section 6 discusses
them. Section 9 concludes. Some details of the data and of the computational analysis are
relegated to the appendices.
2 Data
I use two U.S. household surveys in order to describe the puzzle in the data. One data source
is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a triennial cross-sectional survey that has detailed
information on household assets and liabilities. In particular, it measures carefully both house-
hold liquid asset holdings and revolving credit card debt, and despite its cross-sectional nature,
allows to assert persistence of this debt, by asking households about frequency of complete debt
payoff (see appendix). I use the 2001 wave of the SCF in this analysis. I separate the SCF
sample into three subgroups: those who have sizeable revolving credit card debt and no sig-
nificant liquid assets (“borrowers”), those who have both in significant amounts (“borrowers
and savers”, i.e. the puzzle group), and those who have liquid assets but no revolving credit
card debt (“savers”). Notice that the borrowing behavior here is defined solely by credit cards,
and saving solely by liquid assets - which include checking, savings and brokerage accounts. I
abstract, in choosing the terminology and focus, from the fact that these households may be,
and usually are, borrowing or saving in other assets.
In addition, I use the 2000-2002 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to study consumption
patterns of the households who revolved credit card debt in 2001, to match the SCF timeline.
This survey is a quarterly rotating panel, where each household is interviewed for five consecutive
quarters, four of which (second through fifth) are available in the public data set. The advantage
of the survey is detailed measurement of all aspects of household monthly consumption: in
each interview, the household is asked to recall all of its expenditures in the preceding three
6
months.4 Although it is less careful about measuring assets and credit card debt, there is enough
information to subdivide this population into the same subgroups as in the SCF. I study the
properties of household consumption in goods paid by liquid assets versus other methods.
In both surveys, I consider those who hold more than $500 in revolving credit card debt and
more than $500 in liquid assets as the borrower-and-saver group.5 I study all households with
heads of age 25 to 64; thus, I exclude college students and retirees, whose saving and borrowing
behavior may differ from the rest of the population (for example, borrowing behavior among
college students may be hard to analyze, since the repayment of their debts is often undertaken
by their parents, as is well documented). The details of the surveys, the sample selection process,
and the puzzle measurement methods are described in the data appendix.
Tables 1 through 4 describe the credit card debt puzzle, and compare the households in the
puzzle group to the rest of the population. I show that these households appear to have the
same demographic characteristics as everyone else, and they lie in the middle of the economic
distribution. I also present evidence that the need for liquidity may be a good candidate for
explaining the puzzle, because the liquid assets that these households have do not seem unrea-
sonably large in amount relative to their income, spending and credit card debt. Tables 5, 6
and 7 then characterize in more detail household liquid asset holdings and their use, in order to
show, in support of the central hypothesis here, that liquid assets do appear to have a significant
and unique role in household finances that cannot be replaced by other instruments.
Table 1 gives the size of the credit card debt puzzle in the data. I present the measurements
from both data sets, to demonstrate that they are close. Judging by descriptive statistics of
both groups (not presented here for the CEX), it is clear that these groups are comparable in
the two surveys, so that analyzing their consumption in the CEX and assets in the SCF is a
valid exercise. To my knowledge, this kind of joint use of the two data sets is the first of its
kind. As is clear, around 27% to 29% of the U.S. population were simultaneously borrowing and
saving in 2001. Only between 5 and 7% of the population are credit card borrowers with little
4To be precise, 65% of the expenditure data are collected via direct questions about the month and amount
of expenditure, while 35% of the expenditures are measured via questions on quarterly spending, which is then
divided into three average-monthly amounts. The latter procedure applies to food, for example. This will affect
some of the results discussed later, but favorably for my purposes (see below).
5I choose the $500 threshold mainly to follow other literature on this subject. Having studied alternatives, I
came to the conclusion that the puzzle measured in different ways is still a significant one in the U.S., while the
subgroups’ characteristics remain stable regardless of the specification.
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Table 1: The Credit Card Debt Puzzle in 2001
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
Puzzle size: Percent distribution
SCF 5% 27% 68%
CEX 7% 29% 64%
Interest rates:
Credit cards 14.8% 13.7% 9.8%
Checking accounts (avg. across groups) 0.7%
Savings accounts (avg. across groups) 1.2%
Notes: “Borrow” refers to revolving debt on credit cards; “save” to saving in liquid
assets. Credit cards are bank-type and store cards that allow revolving debt. Liquid
assets are checking, savings, and brokerage accounts. Interest rates on checking and
savings accounts are from a survey by bankrate.com, and represent national averages
for the entire population. Credit card interest rates are from the SCF question
“What is the interest rate you pay on the credit card with the highest balance?” For
the puzzle group (“borrow & save”) measurement, I take everyone with liquid asset
holdings above $500, and credit card debt above $500.
or no liquid assets, and the rest have no significant credit card debt. Notice that these numbers
imply that of all habitual credit card debt revolvers, 80 to 84% have some liquid assets that
they could in principle use to pay down their debt! The last three rows of the table give average
interest rates that households report paying on their credit card debt versus national interest
average rates on checking and savings accounts. It is clear that there is a significant difference
in the rates, which gives the appearance of a violation of the standard no-arbitrage condition,
and which originally gave rise to the term “credit card debt puzzle”.
Table 2 breaks down some of the demographic characteristics of the subgroups from the SCF;
the numbers are nearly replicated in the CEX, and not presented here. Each cell of the table
shows a percentage of the subgroup that has the characteristic. For example, the first line shows
that 70% of the borrower group, 74% of the saver group, and 78% of the puzzle group are white.
Comparing the numbers for different characteristics to the overall sample average shown in the
right column, we see that none of them seem particularly pronounced for the borrower-and-saver
group. The borrower-and-saver group is skewed slightly toward white households (78% versus
75% overall average), toward married households (62% versus 59%), toward heads employed full-
time (84% versus 81%) and in white collar occupations (61% versus 58%) - perhaps contrary to
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Table 2: Demographics
Borrow Borrow Save Share in
& Save Population
% of subgroup with characteristic
Race: white 0.70 0.78 0.74 0.75
Marital status: married 0.48 0.62 0.58 0.59
Have dependent children 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.40
Head works full-time 0.76 0.85 0.80 0.81
Head white-collar/prof. 0.48 0.61 0.58 0.58
Education: less than HS 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.11
HS/some college 0.73 0.61 0.51 0.55
College degree or more 0.14 0.33 0.36 0.34
Source: 2001 SCF. Weighted averages within subgroups.
what we might expect. The share of households in this group with dependent children is on par
with the overall average. They also tend to be slightly better educated: the group has the fewest
households with education of less than high school (5% versus 11%), while the share of those
with a college degree or above is the same as it is nationally. The saver group compares similarly
to national averages, while the borrower group is the one that is least educated, comprises most
unmarried households, and is skewed most toward nonwhite households. The main idea here
is to show that there is nothing inherent in demographic or “socioeconomic” terms about the
borrowing and saving group that might lead them to behave differently from others.6
Table 3 presents income and asset information for each subgroup. The puzzle group clearly
lies in the middle of the economic distribution. Their mean total after-tax annual income
is $52,114, as compared to $64,331 for the saver group, and $28,032 for the borrower group.
They hold, on average, about 1.7 times their monthly income in liquid assets (and only 0.8 in
the median), as compared to the liquidity holdings of the savers of 2.5 times monthly income
(and equal to it in the median).7 Several further insights are important. First, while liquidity
holdings of the borrower-and-saver group are not negligible, at $3,000 in the median, they are
6This is confirmed in formal probit analysis, not presented here.
7A concern may arise that these numbers could be collected at the beginning of the month, say, when the
paycheck has just arrived into the account. As per the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, which collects the
data, SCF interviews are conducted throughout the month, and these asset numbers thus represent a monthly
average on the account.
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Table 3: Income and Asset Holding
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
U.S. Dollars
Credit card debt: Mean 5,172 5,766 317
Median 3,340 3,800 0
Liquid assets: Mean 227 7,237 17,386
Median 200 3,000 3,200
Total after-tax income: Mean 28,032 52,114 64,331
Median 25,350 43,600 39,950
Other financial assets: Mean 4,424 40,545 102,558
Median 0 4,400 4,100
Net wealth: Mean 36,231 187,508 466,462
Median 9,450 84,640 104,500
Liquid assets as share of Mean 0.12 1.71 2.53
monthly after-tax income Median 0.10 0.79 0.88
Source: 2001 SCF. “Other financial assets” include IRA’s, mutual funds, bond
and equity holdings, annuities, life insurance. Net wealth is all assets, financial
and non-financial, net of liabilities.
not unreasonable either, relative to their income. Secondly, these households have significant
amounts of nonliquid financial assets as well, so there is no evidence that they are unaware of
more lucrative saving opportunities. These facts suggest that the liquidity holdings of these
households may, in fact, be geared toward some well thought-out purpose in any given month.
Compare this to the savers, who evidently have enough liquidity both to cover their credit card
expenses, so they need not revolve debt (the majority of them do have and use credit cards),
and to cover any monthly liquid expenditure needs as well. Insofar as we may think of the savers
as the least constrained group - i.e. most able to achieve their first-best allocation - these data
suggest that the borrower-and-saver group might like to hold even more liquidity than they are
able to.
In addition, the presence of significant nonliquid financial assets in all but the borrowers’ port-
folios, as well as a look at the net worth of these households, suggest that strategic bankruptcy
behavior, as per Lehnert and Maki (2001), is highly unlikely for at least the majority of the
puzzle households. Finally, note that on average, the amount of debt these households have is
approximately equal (higher in the median, at $3,800, but lower in the mean) to their liquid
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Table 4: Home Ownership by Subgroup
Borrow Borrow Save Share in
& Save Population
% of subgroup with characteristic
Own house with mortgage 0.41 0.59 0.47 0.50
Own house without mortgage 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.12
Rent 0.40 0.23 0.28 0.28
Source: 2001 SCF. Totals do not add up to one because some categories (such as town-
house/condo association) are excluded.
holdings; if they were to use their liquidity to pay off debt, they would be left with little or no
money in the bank in most cases.
Table 4 presents a further aspect of household asset holdings: homeowners (especially those
who pay mortgage) are more likely to be in the puzzle subgroup. They are overrepresented in
this group compared to the overall average: homeowners with mortgage constitute 59% of this
group, relative to only 50% of the population.
The evidence presented so far would suggest that there is no apparent reason to assume any-
thing different about the preferences of these households, and it seems likely that the motivation
for this observed behavior is economic in nature. Moreover, households appear to diversify their
portfolios, as they tend to have investments in real estate and significant holdings of nonliquid
financial assets. In other words, it appears that the liquid holdings that households have may
be designated for a specific purpose which may have priority over credit card repayment up to
a certain level of liquid assets. Those households that are not overly cash-rich (see table 3) may
have liquid assets under that level, so it may be optimal for them to delay debt repayment in
favor of keeping the liquid assets available in the bank. In addition, as discussed, homeowners
are more likely to be in the puzzle group than non-homeowners. This makes sense once we
consider that the expenditures for which credit is not accepted in payment have most to do with
home ownership - examples are mortgage payments and especially household operations and
repairs, for which the owner of the house, rather than a renter, would be responsible, and which
also are often unexpected and large in magnitude. The next three tables demonstrate in more
detail that liquid assets appear to have an important autonomous role in household finances that
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Table 5: Aggregate Consumer Transactions, Shares by Method of Payment
Transaction number Transaction volume
1999 2000 2002 1990 1999 2000 2002
Liquid 78.2 77.8 76.7 81.2 70.3 68.8 64.9
Checks 27.9 26.9 24.4 61.3 46.2 43.9 39.0
Cash 44.2 43.5 41.3 19.6 19.4 18.9 19.5
Debit 6.1 7.4 11.0 0.3 4.7 6.0 8.4
Electronic 1.5 1.8 2.4 0.7 3.4 4.2 5.6
Credit Cards 17.4 17.7 17.6 14.5 22.5 23.9 24.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 2003
cannot be replaced by other assets, which would support the hypothesis under investigation.
In aggregate, it is clear that liquid assets have retained an obviously dominant role in con-
sumer transactions, even though credit card usage has been growing somewhat. Table 5 gives
aggregate consumer transactions by payment method for selected years from 1990 to 2002. In
2002, liquid payment methods, such as cash, checks, and debit cards, accounted for 77% of total
consumer transactions, or 65% of their total value. If we include electronic payments in this
category, since they are most often backed by a checking account directly, the numbers go up to
79% and 71%, respectively. In contrast, credit cards accounted for only 24% of the value of all
consumer purchases in 2002.
I turn to the CEX to study household liquid asset holdings relative to their consumption
patterns in goods that require the use of liquid assets. Many subtle issues are involved in
separating out the group of goods that may be considered cash-only goods. Although survey data
on consumer payment method choice are scant to nonexistent, one such survey was conducted in
2004 by the American Bankers Association. In it, consumers were asked questions about their
perceptions and usage of payment methods; in particular, they were asked how they normally
pay at different types of stores and for different types of bills. I present the details of this
survey in appendix A.3. Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 summarize the relevant information. It is clear
from the survey that liquid payment methods dominate household expenditures. Consumers
overwhelmingly pay all house-related types of bills that are asked about in the survey, such as
rents, mortgages, insurance, and utilities, by check or related liquid instruments (e.g. direct debit
from the account). They also tend to pay for child care and tuition with liquid instruments,
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but I do not include intermittent expenses such as tuition in the cash-only group, as they
are likely to skew the perception of volatility (see appendix). Payments for home repairs are
not asked about in the survey; however, in the SCF, households name emergencies as their
number two reason for saving, preceded only by asset investment for retirement.8 While we
see evidence that they save for retirement in retirement accounts, emergencies, including home-
related ones, by their definition are likely to require liquid savings. In terms of payment methods
in stores, the evidence suggests that while credit cards are predominant in department stores,
gas stations and convenience stores, liquid payment methods dominate in supermarkets, drug
stores, restaurants and transit systems. Backed by this information, I choose the group of cash-
only goods that consists of rents, mortgages, utilities, repairs, household operations, property
taxes, insurance, public transportation, health insurance, and also food, alcohol and tobacco.
For most of these goods, it is largely a requirement that a liquid payment method be used, but
this is not true for the last three good groups. For these goods, we see that consumers do pay for
them predominantly in liquid instruments, but they frequently are likely to have the option to
use a credit card as well (as evidenced by the survey, where some 20-30% of such expenditures
are made by credit). The justification for including these three good groups as cash-only goods
are also in the appendix. As a sensitivity check of the results, I will experiment with exclusion
of these goods, but I take inclusion of food as the main case to study. In any event, food, alcohol
and tobacco are a minority of this expenditure category.
Table 6 presents household liquid asset holdings relative to average monthly consumption
of cash-only goods. In the borrower-and-saver group, the median household has 1.5 times its
average monthly liquid consumption in the bank accounts, while the mean household has 3.4
times the amount. Again, these are numbers that are significant but seemingly not unreasonable.
Compare these with the holdings of the saver group, who have on average 10 times their mean
monthly liquid spending, or twice the monthly spending amount in the median. Again we see
that the savers are better equipped to handle both their liquid spending needs and credit card
bills, rather than having to prioritize one over the other due to scarce liquid resources.
The evidence in table 6 points to precautionary demand for money: households have liquid
asset amounts that are in excess of what they spend on average per month, and those who
8The question reads “What are your most important reasons for saving?” Respondents get to choose as many
as they want in the order of declining importance.
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Table 6: Household Liquidity Holding and Consumption Patterns
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
U.S. Dollars
Liquid assets: Mean 227 7,338 17,435
Median 200 3,000 3,200
Monthly cash-only good cons: Mean 1,561 2,106 1,665
Median 1,369 1,890 1,433
Liquid assets/cons: Mean 0.1 3.4 10.0
Median 0.1 1.5 2.0
Source: SCF, CEX. Household levels, weighted averages.
Table 7: Unpredictable Volatility of Average Monthly Household Cash-Good Consumption
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
Avg. conditional standard deviation
Cash-only goods, including food 20.1% 21.0% 21.6%
Cash-only goods, excluding food 23.3% 23.9% 25.3%
Source: CEX. Conditional standard deviation: population average of indi-
vidual conditional standard deviation of month-to-month liquid consump-
tion, taken across a 12-month period in which the household appears in
the survey. Measured by regressing log liquid household consumption on a
set of month and year dummies and household fixed effect. The residual
is taken as the idiosyncratic unpredictable component, with its conditional
standard deviation used here. Cash goods: see appendix A.3.
are sufficiently well-off are holding much more liquidity than those in the middle, suggesting
that richer households choose to buffer themselves more fully, and that some households become
constrained from doing so completely, which may lead to borrowing-and-saving behavior on their
part.
I now turn to characterizing one of the likely causes of this precautionary behavior. Table
7 shows volatility of consumption in the cash-only good category, measured as average monthly
conditional standard deviation of household liquid expenditures. There are several issues that
arise in constructing this measure of volatility. First, measuring raw volatility of consumption
may not be fully informative about unpredictable volatility, since it may also reflect seasonal
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volatility, for example, as well as other factors that may be predictable to the household. Second,
users of the CEX data frequently use quarterly averages of consumption rather than the monthly
measure because some questions are asked only as averages over three months, as mentioned
before. To answer in part the first concern, I exclude from the expenditures all purchases made
as gifts; this information is explicitly collected in the CEX for each purchase reported. This
should help remove some of the seasonality in the consumption series, since much of seasonal
purchasing is done in holiday gifts. In addition, following literature on idiosyncratic income
and consumption uncertainty (see, e.g., Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron 2004b), I filter out the
predictable component of expenditures, by regressing the log of cash-only consumption for each
household on a household fixed effect, to control for household characteristics known to the
household, as well as a full set of month and year dummies, to control for any seasonal effects.
I treat the volatility of the residual as a measure of unpredictable consumption volatility; the
average conditional standard deviation of this process across households is taken as the final
measure of this volatility. For the group of goods selected in the cash-only good category, the
household and seasonal factors reduce, but not substantially, the volatility of the consumption
series. To answer the second concern, I also measured volatility based on quarterly aggregates of
the monthly expenditure responses. Although this leaves only three observations per household,
the measures of volatility remain robust to this specification - they go down, but only slightly.
Thus, insofar as it is possible with such short panels, I can be fairly confident that I have an
accurate measure of consumption volatility.
In addition, as discussed in the data appendix, including food in the cash-good category
downplays the estimate of volatility, because it is measured as an average across three months
in each household interview; thus, I show volatility measures both including and excluding food.
Volatility appears quite significant at 20-22% of the average when food is included, and 23-25%
when it is not. Volatility is slightly higher for savers, and lowest for borrowers, which may
reflect differing ability of these groups, given their asset positions, to insure against shocks in
consumption. Again, housing-related expenditures constitute the bulk of the cash-only good
group and a sizeable portion of them is likely to be unpredictable. The volatility we observe
in cash-only good consumption may be a reflection of such unexpected, and possibly large,
spending shocks; households try to insure against them by holding extra liquidity in the bank.
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To sum up, data suggest that the credit card debt puzzle is significant in magnitude, but
it may not be as puzzling as it appears initially. There are situations where liquidity is a
non-substitutable resource, and the resulting demand for liquidity may be significant enough to
account for households who choose to hold on to their liquid assets instead of paying down credit
card debt. The rest of the paper is devoted to evaluating formally whether this hypothesis can
account for the data. First, I lay down a model that can address this question in a disciplined
way. Then, I calibrate this model and use it to measure the ability of the need for liquidity to
account for the credit card debt puzzle.
3 Model
Time is discrete. There is a [0,1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents. Each period is divided into
two subperiods that differ by their market arrangements. There are two consumption goods:
one consumed in subperiod 1, the other in subperiod 2. There are also two instruments available
to agents in each period. One is money, denoted mjt - a storable, perfectly divisible, intrinsically
worthless object, potentially useful only as a medium of exchange. This instrument represents
all liquid assets, including checks and debit cards. Its essential feature is that it is an instant
form of payment, rather than a form of credit. The subscript j stands for the subperiod, while t
is for the period. The other instrument is a noncontingent bond, bjt, borrowing through which
at a rate rt captures consumer credit (which can be interpreted as a credit card in the current
context); saving in it is also allowed.
In the goods market in the first subperiod, either money or credit can be used in trade.
In contrast, during the second subperiod, consumer credit is not allowed in trade.9 In both
subperiods, there are competitive firms producing the consumption good in the background.
In the first subperiod, they take labor supplied by households as input, while in the second,
households do not provide any inputs into production, and simply buy consumption goods
from the firms at prices they take parametrically. Although markets are competitive, they are
incomplete: insurance markets are closed during both subperiods.
9The question of why credit cannot be used is beyond the scope of this paper, since it is not pertinent to
the empirical problem at hand. There are several approaches to it in the literature: one is to assume spatial
separation between the earner and the shopper, as in Lucas-style cash-credit good models; another is to assume
that agents are anonymous, as in money search models following Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). See Telyukova and
Wright (2008) for a related model of money and credit that addresses the issue in more detail in a similar context.
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During each period, households are subject to idiosyncratic income and preference uncer-
tainty. There is no aggregate uncertainty. The shocks on income and preferences do not realize
simultaneously: income shocks realize at the beginning of the first subperiod, while preference
shocks realize at the beginning of the second. Since there are no insurance markets for these
shocks, the only way to insure is by accumulating one or both of the assets m and b.
At the beginning of the first subperiod, the household’s income shock st realizes. Agents then
supply labor inelastically (that is, there is no labor choice) and earn their income, consume with
either credit or money, and allocate their resources between the two instruments in a household
portfolio. Let us assume that st ∈ S is a discrete Markov process, with S = {s, s2, ..., s¯}, s > 0.
The transition matrix is given by Γ(st, st+1), with each entry denoting probability of entering
state st+1 given that the currently realized state is st.
At the start of the second subperiod, the consumer’s preference shock zt realizes, also assumed
to be a discrete Markov process with z ∈ Z = {z, z2, ..., z¯}, and transition matrix Π(zt, zt+1).
Note that the shocks on income and preferences, and their transitions, are assumed to be inde-
pendent of each other. After the realization of z, the subperiod’s market opens. Here, households
choose consumption conditional on their preference shock realization, but it is crucial to note
that they cannot produce or borrow in this market, so they do not have access to additional
income when they need to consume. This assumption is meant to capture the fact that in any
given month, a household is likely to encounter liquid-asset spending opportunities continually
and randomly, without simultaneous opportunities to rebalance their portfolios or get additional
income.
In each subperiod, the household’s state variables are its current knowledge of the idiosyn-
cratic shock processes s and z, and its current portfolio (m, b). Since the income shock st realizes
at the beginning of the first subperiod, while the preference shock zt does not realize until the
second, in the first subperiod the state is (st, zt−1,m1t, b1t). Correspondingly, the state in the
second subperiod is (st, zt,m2t, b2t). Agents take prices as given, so prices, or alternatively the
distribution of agents, are aggregate state variables, which I make implicit in the notation.
Lifetime utility is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[u1(c1t) + ztu2(c2t)],
17
where it is assumed that ∀ j = {1, 2}, where j denotes the subperiod, uj ∈ C
3, u′j(·) > 0,
u′′j (·) < 0, u
′′′
j (·) > 0 and the functions satisfy Inada conditions, limcjt→0 u
′
j(cjt) = ∞ and
limcjt→∞ u
′
j(cjt) = 0. I assume that the preference shock is multiplicative on the utility of con-
sumption in the second subperiod. Note that in this formulation of the problem, the utility
function is assumed to be separable in first- and second-subperiod consumption. This is not
necessary for any of the results that I want to emphasize, but does make analysis more trans-
parent. For computation, I will make the utility function nonseparable, as it is more realistic
from the data point of view, and adds interesting empirical insights.10
I formulate the household problem recursively.11 The nature of the question makes it suf-
ficient to study the partial equilibrium of this problem: that is, I will set prices exogenously
and study the resulting decision rules. In the first subperiod, a household solves the following
problem:
V1(st, zt−1,m1t, b1t) = max
c1t,m2t,b2t
u1(c1t) + Ezt|zt−1V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t) (1)
s.t. c1t + φ1tm2t = st + φ1tm1t + b2t − b1t(1 + rt)
b2t ≤ B¯
c1t ≥ 0,m2t ≥ 0
Here, φ1t is the real value of money, that is, the inverse of the price on the consumption good.
rt is the interest rate that is charged on debt at the beginning of subperiod 1. I assume, as is
necessary for existence of a stationary equilibrium, that β < 1/(1+ rt)∀ t (Aiyagari, 1994). The
expectation term is written conditional on only the previous realization of the shock, reflecting
the assumption above that the shock has a Markov form. The second constraint imposes a
credit limit on the household, here taken to be exogenous. Notice that there is no nonnegativity
constraint on debt: agents can save in b2t.
12
10To be precise, if in this study I were concerned with the interaction, for example, of monetary policy with
the credit market, the separability assumption would be restrictive in the analytical context, since it severs an
interaction channel between the two markets. In the current context, however, the analytical results I emphasize
do not hinge on the separability assumption. Empirically, the interaction of the two consumption goods may play
a part in the magnitude of the results, and it seems natural to assume that it is non-trivial in reality; I will take
up this issue in the computational part of the paper.
11The Principle of Optimality applies here as is standard. In addition, existence and uniqueness are guaranteed
as long as standard assumptions are made on the utility function and the constraint space to make the problem
bounded.
12In computation, I will allow for an interest spread: interest rate on borrowing, b2t > 0, will be higher than
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In the second subperiod, households solve the following problem, once the preference shock
realizes:
V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t) = max
c2t
ztu2(c2t) + βEst+1|stV1(st+1, zt,m1,t+1, b1,t+1) (2)
s.t. c2t ≤ φ2tm2t
m1,t+1 = m2t −
c2t
φ2t
b1,t+1 = b2t
φ2t again denotes the subperiod’s real value of money. Notice from the third equality that no
interest on consumer debt is accumulated in the second subperiod - this captures the grace
period typical of a credit card billing cycle.
Because in this problem the timing of the decisions between the two subperiods affects
the state variables on which these decisions depend, it helps to keep track of the states ex-
plicitly while discussing the solution. Denote the state variables of the first subperiod as
x1t = (st, zt−1,m1t, b1t). Then, the decision rules from the first-subperiod problem are c1t(x1t),
m2t(x1t), and b2t(x1t). In addition, let λ(x1t) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
credit constraint. The first-order conditions that characterize the solution to this problem are,
∀x1t:
− u′1(c1t(x1t))φ1t + Ezt|zt−1V2m(st, zt,m2t(x1t), b2t(x1t)) = 0 (3)
u′1(c1t(x1t)) + Ezt|zt−1V2b(st, zt,m2t(x1t), b2t(x1t))− λ(x1t) = 0 (4)
The envelope conditions of the first subperiod are:
V1m(x1t) = φ1tu
′
1(c1t(x1t)) (5)
V1b(x1t) = −(1 + rt)u
′
1(c1t(x1t)) (6)
Denote by x2t = (st, zt,m2t, b2t) the state of the agent in subperiod 2; note again that it is
different from the state in subperiod 1. Then the decision rule of this subperiod is c2t(x2t), and
I denote the Lagrange multiplier on the money constraint µ(x2t). The first-order condition of
this problem is:
ztu
′
2(c2t(x2t))− µ(x2t)−
β
φ2t
Est+1|stV1m(st+1, zt,m2t −
c2t(x2t)
φ2t
, b2t) = 0. (7)
that on saving, b2t < 0. This does not change the nature of the problem, but would require additional notation.
In the analytical discussion, I abstract from this.
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The envelope conditions are, after substituting in (5) and (6),
V2m(x2t) = βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)) + φ2tµ(x2t) (8)
V2b(x2t) = −βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)). (9)
Combining the first-order conditions with the envelope conditions, we get the following char-
acterization. In any equilibrium, the solution to the household problem in this economy (a partial
equilibrium) is given by the set of decision rules {c1t(x1t),m2t(x1t), b2t(x1t), c2t(x2t)} that satisfy
the following Euler equations (along with the budget constraint and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for the multipliers), ∀x1t, x2t:
φ1tu
′
1(c1t(x1t)) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)) + φ2tµ(x2t)} (10)
u′1(c1t(x1t))− λ(x1t) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1))} (11)
ztu
′
2(c2t(x2t)) = βEst+1|st
φ1,t+1
φ2t
u′1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)) + µ(x2t) (12)
In a stationary equilibrium, the solution to the household problem is characterized by the above
equations, with rt = r∀t, and φ1t = φ1, φ2t = φ2∀t. In addition, as long as the Markov transition
matrices for the shocks satisfy monotone mixing condition (Hopenhayn and Prescott, 1992) and
given the assumption on rt relative to β, associated with the solution is a stationary distribution
of agents, which does not change period to period in aggregate, although individual agents
change states due to the idiosyncratic shocks.
In what follows, I describe the properties of the model related to the credit card debt puzzle.
Some of these properties are quite standard, and are presented for completeness, and in order
to highlight the features of the model that relate to the credit card debt puzzle.
Property 1. Nontrivial distribution of assets. Given the assumptions on the utility func-
tions, the equilibrium distribution of households across money and debt holdings is nondegener-
ate. That is, m2t(x1t) and b2t(x1t) are nontrivial functions of their states.
As is standard, the distribution of agents is driven by heterogeneous histories of idiosyncratic
shocks here, which reflect in the asset decisions and states m and b. This is obvious from the
Euler Equations (10) and (11), which equate the marginal utility of first-subperiod consumption
with the marginal value of carrying a dollar in cash or of “saving” a dollar by repaying debt,
and from the budget constraint. It clearly follows from this property that c1t(x1t) and c2t(x2t)
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are also nontrivial functions of their states. Having established that there is a distribution of
agents across states, I will from now on make the dependence of the decision rules on the states
implicit in the notation. I next show that it is always optimal to partially insure against the
preference shocks, and that the level of insurance will depend on the cost of insurance as well
as the individual state.
Property 2. Optimally Incomplete Insurance. In any equilibrium,
1. Optimal decisions involve partial insurance against preference shocks. That is, for any x1t,
∀t, ∃ zˆt ≤ z¯ such that c2t < m2t for all zt < zˆt, and c2t = m2t otherwise.
2. The degree of partial insurance depends on relative returns to assets, φt+1/φt, rt+1, as well
as the state x1t.
Discussion. 1. The intuition is easily seen in a stationary equilibrium, although
it carries through in any equilibrium of this problem. In a stationary equilibrium,
rt = r ∀t and φ1t = φ1 ∀t. Notice from (11) that
βEzt|zt−1Est+1|stu
′
1(c1,t+1) =
u′1(c1t)
1 + r
. (13)
From this and (10), we get the following equation for m2t:
φ1u
′
1(c1t) =
φ1u
′
1(c1t)
1 + r
+ φ2
∑
{zi:c2t(zi)=m2t}
Γ(zt−1, zi)µ(·),
or equivalently,
u′1(c1t)(φ1 −
φ1
1 + r
) = φ2
∑
{zi:c2t(zi)=m2t}
Γ(zt−1, zi)µ(·). (14)
Denote the right-hand side of (14) as
Ψ ≡ φ2
∑
{zi:c2t(zi)=m2t}
Γ(zt−1, zi)µ(·).
Ψ can be thought of as expected shadow value of relaxing a binding money constraint
in the second subperiod, where µ > 0 whenever the constraint binds. By Inada
conditions on the utility function, we have Ψ > 0 as long as 1+ r > 1, which implies
that the constraint on c2t binds in at least one state z if there is a wedge in returns
between money and bonds/debt.
Now suppose that the agent knows that his next realization of zt will be zt = z,
the lowest realization. In this deterministic case, the agent chooses cd1t, c
d
2t and
corresponding md2t such that
φ1u
′
1(c
d
1t) = φ2zu
′
2(c
d
2t),
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where the equality comes from combining deterministic versions of the Euler equa-
tions for m2t and c2t (10) and (12). If the realization of the next preference shock
is unknown, as in the current economy, then the agent solves, from these Euler
equations,
φ1u
′
1(c
s
1t) = Ezt|zt−1φ2ztu
′
2(c
s
2t) > φ2zu
′
2(c
d
2t).
From the last inequality, it is clear that cs1t < c
d
1t, while m
s
2t > m
d
2t for any agent
that is not borrowing-constrained, to keep all the Euler equations holding. In states
zt > z, c
s
2t(zt) > c
d
2t(z).
To summarize, for any x1t, there exists a cutoff level zˆt ≤ z¯, such that c2t < m2t for
zt < zˆt, and c2t = m2t otherwise.
2. Denote the agent’s assets as a1t = φ1m1t−b1t(1+r). By (14) and strict concavity
of u1(·), ∂Ψ/∂c1t < 0, and so ∂Ψ/∂a1t < 0. Also, ∂Ψ/∂r > 0. That is, an increase
in first-subperiod consumption increases the amount of insurance taken against the
preference shocks, as does an increase in assets. At the same time, an increase in the
cost of insurance r reduces the optimal amount of insurance, as long as r > 0.
I showed above that agents are constrained against achieving first-best in every realization
of zt since it is simply too costly, but that there is precautionary demand for money even if
carrying money is dominated by repaying debt (or saving in b), so that for most states except
the most constrained, for some zt, m1,t+1 > 0 - agents will have positive liquid assets at the end
of the period. As an aside, note that if there is no wedge in returns between the two assets,
agents become indifferent between them, so one can insure completely against any realization of
zt as long as one holds any nonliquid assets (that is,
∑
zi:c2t(zi)=m2t
µ(zi) = 0), while if the cost
of insurance is extremely high (r →∞), agents may choose not to hold precautionary balances
at all, so the money constraint would bind everywhere. Note also that if we fix s for any agent,
(14) gives that more asset-wealthy people prefer to insure against preference shocks more fully
- in other words, preference shocks become more important relative to income shocks, the more
assets a household has.
I next show that an interior solution to the problem admits a wedge in returns between
liquid assets and consumer credit, with the latter being more expensive. Since my analysis will
continue in partial equilibrium, an alternative way to view this is that if prices are set such that
consumer credit is more expensive than liquidity, an interior solution exists.
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Property 3. Difference in rates of returns. An interior solution to the household problem
admits 1 + rt+1 >
φ1,t+1
φ1t
. In stationary equilibrium, 1 + r > 1.
Discussion. Consider household Euler equations (10) and (11). For the majority
of the households, the credit limit constraint does not bind, so that λ(x1t) = 0, and
for these households, the Euler equations give
u′1(c1t) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st
φ1,t+1
φ1t
u′1(c1,t+1) +
φ2tµt
φ1t
}
u′1(c1t) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1)}
By property 2, µt(x2t) > 0 for some x2t. Thus we have Ezt|zt−1
φ2tµt
φ1t
> 0, and so it is
clear from comparing the right-hand sides of equations above that
Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st
φ1,t+1
φ1t
u′1(c1,t+1)} < Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1)},
and therefore,
φ1,t+1
φ1t
< 1 + rt+1.
In stationary equilibrium, this turns into
1 < 1 + r.
Property 3 and equation (14) give a complete characterization of agents’ self-insurance be-
havior. Even for very good states x1t, it is at most possible that agents carry exactly enough
money to pay for consumption c2t when the shock has its maximal realization, that is, they will
never opt to carry more money that they would spend if zt = z¯.
13 By Inada conditions on u(c2),
it is always optimal to have at least some consumption in the second subperiod, even in the
lowest state realizations.
The above discussion leads us to consider the agents’ behavior in regard to money and debt
holdings. I show that the model generates the three subgroups in the population: borrowers,
savers, and those who do both. The model thus replicates the credit card debt puzzle, at least
qualitatively.
13Note also that in the model as it is written now, incomplete insurance against preference shocks implies that
agents do not use cash holdings to insure against income shocks - these will instead, as is well-known, increase
saving/ decrease borrowing in b2t, relative to an economy with no uncertainty in income. This is because the
model abstracts from cash advances, which can prompt income uncertainty to be a second channel to affect
precautionary demand in money. See the Discussion section for further details.
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Property 4. Optimality of different borrowing and saving behavior.
In every period, there exist three subgroups of the population:
- Borrowers have m2t > 0, b2t > 0 but m1,t+1 = 0;
- Borrowers and savers have m2t > 0, b2t > 0 and m1,t+1 > 0;
- Savers have b2t ≤ 0, while m2t > 0 and m1,t+1 ≥ 0.
Of those who borrow in any given period, a positive measure of agents will borrow again in the
next, that is, b1t > 0 and b2t > 0 (debt revolving).
Discussion. By property 2, m2t > 0 for all agents in all states. Moreover, since
partial insurance is optimal, for any asset level and some realizations of shock zt, the
money constraint binds, while for others it does not, so we havem1,t+1 = m2t−c2t = 0
for some (x1t, zt), while m1,t+1 > 0 for other (x1t, zt). Thus we have the money
holding combinations for the three subgroups.
It remains to show that b2t > 0 for some states x1t. Suppose household’s assets at
are at some very low level such that only minimal insurance is optimal, as given by
(14), and we get µ(·) > 0∀ z, so from Euler equations (10) and (12),
φ1tu
′
1(c1t) > Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1)}
ztu
′
2(c2t) >
1
φ2t
βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1).
That is, these agents value present consumption more than future consumption, and
are willing to shift assets from tomorrow to today in order to reduce the inequalities.
They are able to do so by borrowing, so we have b2t > 0. In the next period, those
who still have low assets will have to “repay” current debt by borrowing more, so
they are revolving the present debt, and we have b1,t+1 > 0 and b2,t+1 > 0.
This last property shows that at different asset positions, it is optimal for the households in
the model to engage in differing borrowing and saving behavior, thus potentially delivering the
three subgroups that are observed in the data. It is important to note, however, that analytically
it is impossible to say whether in the stationary distribution, households will actually find
themselves at all of these asset positions. For example, we know that for some low level of assets
a household will borrow. But we do not know whether any model household will actually have
that low level of assets. This question can only be answered quantitatively, and in the next
section, I show that such low levels of assets do in fact occur in the calibrated model.
To summarize, the model delivers all of the empirically desirable features of the credit card
debt puzzle in the data: precautionary demand for money, existence of an equilibrium when
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credit is costly, and a subdivision of the population into three groups with liquid saving and
borrowing behavior akin to those in the data. Note that the aggregate distribution of the
population is plausible in this respect: people with very low assets and low shocks are borrowers,
people in the middle of the asset and shock-history distribution are the puzzle group, while those
at the top are savers only. Finally, it is important to note that households in the model will move
in and out of the “puzzle” subgroup depending on their shock histories, so that no households
would be in this situation permanently. I now calibrate and compute the model, in order to
evaluate the power of the liquidity need hypothesis to account for the credit card debt puzzle.
4 Computation and Calibration
4.1 Transformed Model
For the purposes of computation, I make some adjustments to the model. First, I make the
utility function nonseparable, combining u1(c1t) and ztu2(c2t) above into a new utility function,
u(c1t, ztc2t), and assuming that the utility function is thrice differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave in both arguments, and its third derivative is strictly positive. Inada conditions
are also assumed to hold. The reason to make the utility function non-separable is that in
reality there is likely to be an interaction between household spending on cash-only goods and
spending on cash-or-credit goods, and this interaction is likely to have an important effect on
results. Second, I introduce an interest spread for saving and borrowing, to match it in the data:
borrowing on credit cards carries a much higher interest rate than saving in other financial assets
does, on average. As this is a partial equilibrium model, these prices are set exogenously. Also, I
normalize φjt = 1∀ j, t, which is innocuous given that I am not studying monetary policy-related
issues, and in addition, I will focus on stationary equilibrium, so that all aggregate variables will
be constant.
Finally, in order to reduce computation time, I reduce the state space in the first subperiod
(no such possibility exists in the second). In particular, define assets (“cash-at-hand”) to be,
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given assumptions on prices listed above:
at = m1t − b1t(1 + rt), where
rt = r
b if b1t > 0
rt = r
s < rb if b1t < 0
The first-subperiod problem can be then rewritten as:
V1(st, zt−1, at) = max
c1t,b2t,m2t
Ezt|zt−1V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t, c1t) (15)
s.t. c1t +m2t − b2t = st + at.
Given all the adjustments, the second-subperiod problem becomes:
V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t, c1t) = max
c2t
u(c1t, ztc2t) + βEst+1|stV1(st+1, zt, at+1) (16)
s.t. c2t ≤ m2t
at+1 = m2t − c2t − b2t(1 + rt+1),
where the interest rate r is determined by whether or not the agent borrows or saves. As before,
this problem is well-behaved and the solution exists, given the utility function specification and
appropriate boundary conditions, which in practice amount to setting bounds on the constraint
set that do not restrict the decision rules. I solve the problem of the household in two stages:
the first-subperiod problem (the outer maximization) is solved by value function iteration with
piecewise linear interpolation, while the second-subperiod problem (the inner maximization)
is solved directly from the first-order condition, by approximating the derivative of the value
function. The inner maximization can, alternatively, be solved by value function iteration as
well - results are complete robust to the choice of method. Details are in the appendix.
4.2 Calibration
I choose model period to be a month, which is a natural frequency for studying household
decisions that involve credit card statements and paychecks. The functional form for the house-
hold utility function is of the standard CRRA form, which incorporates a CES consumption
aggregator between the two consumption goods:
u(c1t, ztc2t) =
((1 − α)cν1t + ztαc
ν
2t)
1−δ
ν
1− δ
with δ > 1.
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This choice satisfies all the necessary assumptions on the utility function listed above. The
utility function gives three parameters to calibrate: α, ν and δ. β, the discount factor, is the
fourth. The other parameters have to do with the shock processes on income and preferences, as
well as prices. I calibrate the parameters of the income process outside the model, set δ to follow
a standard choice in the literature, set the prices to those reported in the SCF, and calibrate the
remaining parameters within the model. I perform this within-model calibration by a minimum
distance estimator based on the simulated method of moments. As is standard, I select the target
moments so that they cover the relevant properties of data and provide discipline in calibrating
the model, but the moments are all unrelated to the main data observations that I am trying to
explain - the size of the credit card debt puzzle in the data, as well as the magnitude of money
holdings that households choose to keep. Thus, these key quantities of interest are left free to
speak for the performance of the liquidity need hypothesis in accounting for the puzzle at hand.
The calibration of the income process is non-trivial in the context of this study. The standard
calibration procedure of the income process parameters involves imposing an AR(1) process
with normally distributed errors on income data from household surveys such as the PSID (e.g.,
Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2004a, 2004b). However, micro data sources that have good
measurements of income provide income data with an annual frequency only. Imposing an AR(1)
process on annual data and using time disaggregation to get the monthly frequency leads to an
extremely persistent monthly process with little variance, which generates little information
about income uncertainty on a monthly basis. Thus, my approach has to depart from this
practice. Instead, I pose a 3-state discrete Markov process as follows. The income states are
chosen to match the relative average earnings of white-collar workers (s3), blue-collar or service
sector workers (s2), and the value of unemployment benefits (s1). This is one of several possible
choices: for example, one could choose relative earnings of college-educated versus non-college-
educated workers instead. I take the data on relative earnings above from the 2004 Bureau of
Labor Statistics reports on earnings of full-time workers by occupation. Note that while one
might like to have a greater number of income states, the key limitation in the number of states
I can pose is that I have to calibrate the transition matrix between the income states, which
prevents me from using, say, income quantiles - there are not enough relevant data at monthly
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frequency to compute a richer set of transition dynamics in question.14 This is not a severe
limitation in this context, as I discuss below.
In order to calibrate transition probabilities between income states, I use the following data.
The average duration of unemployment in 2001, according to the BLS, was 13.5 weeks, which
determines the monthly probability of exiting unemployment. I let the probabilities of exiting
from unemployment into blue-collar and white-collar occupations to be determined by the shares
of blue- and white-collar workers among the unemployed in the BLS data, which were 56% and
44% respectively in 2001.
Associated with the transition matrix Γs is the invariant distribution of agents across the
three income states. Denoting this distribution as {γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 , γ
∗
3}, I get two additional conditions:
γ∗1 should equal the average monthly unemployment rate, which was 4.75% in 2001, and γ
∗
2 - the
share of blue-collar workers among the employed, which was 43.5%. γ∗3 is the complement of the
other two. Finally, I need to set one more parameter: I calibrate the probability of transitioning
from a blue-collar job to a white-collar job to upward mobility rates for blue-collar workers, as
computed by the BLS and reported by Gabriel (2003). The reported average monthly probability
of an upward occupational move by a blue-collar worker was around 0.7% in 1998-1999. It is
plausible that in 2001, this number might have declined slightly, due to a shift in economic
conditions, but as I do not have specific information to that effect, I use this statistic here. The
parameters of the resulting earnings process are reported in table 8.
This calibration has a clear limitation: it has no hope of capturing the top tail of the income
distribution, nor indeed does it mimic the overall income inequality in the U.S. The top income
level is only five times the lowest income level in this calibration, and over one-half of the
population experiences the highest (also most persistent) income state. That is, the bottom tail
is also clearly understated in the model. Whereas the Gini coefficient for income in the U.S. was
0.55 in 2001 in my sample, in the model it is only 0.15.
However, for the current exercise, it is not a significant problem. First, the credit card debt
puzzle, as I demonstrated in my data analysis, is a phenomenon concentrated in the middle
of the distribution, with mean and median incomes far below the top tail. Thus, understating
the top tail of the distribution will restrict me from matching the top tail in the model, but
14In ongoing separate work, Telyukova and Klein (2008) are looking at ways to solve this problem, based
somewhat on the methodology of Gervais and Klein (2006).
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Table 8: Earnings Process
Parameters Value
Earnings states {s1, s2, s3} { 0.2, 0.59, 1.0 }
Transition matrix Γ(st, st+1)


0.706 0.163 0.131
0.021 0.971 0.008
0.010 0.007 0.983


Invariant distribution in earnings Γ∗s { 0.048, 0.414, 0.538 }
that population group is not of most concern for the question at hand. Second, insofar as I
understate the bottom tail of the data income distribution, I am biasing my results on the size
of the borrower-and-saver group downwards - so the result of the computation can then be seen
as a lower bound on what the model can account for. I will discuss this matter more in the
results section.15
Aside from the income process, 8 parameters remain, including the prices. I choose the risk
aversion parameter, δ = 2, on the conservative side of the standard range in the literature. The
monthly interest rate on saving in nonliquid financial assets is set to match the annual rate of
4%, so that rs = 0.0033. I set rb = 0.011, which corresponds to the annual rate of 14%, the
average interest rate paid on revolving credit card debt as reported in the SCF.
This leaves me with the discount rate β, the parameters of the consumption aggregator α
and ν, and the preference process parameters, which have to be calibrated from the model. I
estimate these parameters from within the model using a minimum-distance estimator based on
the simulated method of moments. That is, the parameter vector is the minimizer of the sum of
weighted squared distances between a relevant set of data moments and their simulated model
counterparts.
15One final note on the income process: with the probabilities of exiting unemployment into white- and blue-
collar jobs proportional to shares of white- and blue-collar workers among the unemployed, it is clear that a
blue-collar worker in the model who becomes unemployed has a significant positive probability of becoming a
white-collar worker. Thus, the uncertainty that blue-collar workers face is crucially understated in this broad
calibration. This means that the model will have a harder time matching the properties of debt in the data - in
particular, this is another source that will put a dampener both on the size of the puzzle group in the model, and
possibly also on the liquidity holdings.
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In the deterministic cash-in-advance literature, the parameters α and ν are typically cali-
brated from a money demand equation which is a direct implication of the first-order conditions
of the problem when the cash-in-advance constraint always binds. Due to idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty, however, these implications do not hold in my model (the money constraint does not
always bind), and no closed-form counterparts exist. For the preference shock parameters, then,
I assume that log(zt) follows an AR(1) process, so the parameters to calibrate will be a persis-
tence parameter ρz and standard deviation σz of this process, which I will then discretize into a
five-state Markov chain. The choice of an AR(1) is motivated by the idea that households have
both constant pre-committed expenditures, and some additional expenditure shocks (extreme
events), both of which have to be captured in the shock process.
The preference shock process is clearly not observed in the data, but the way households
respond to these shocks is through their cash-only good consumption. Thus, the preference
shock process has to match properties of consumption of cash-only goods in the data, namely
its persistence (autocorrelation) and volatility (conditional standard deviation). In choosing the
other targets for the estimation, I discipline the model by not setting as targets quantities that
predetermine the size of the puzzle or liquidity holdings directly, since these are the quantities
I seek to explain. I choose nine moments in total with this in mind; they are volatility of liquid
consumption for each subgroup of households, autocorrelation of liquid consumption for the sam-
ple as a whole, mean cash-only good consumption relative to income for each of the subgroups,
the mean debt-to-income and mean nonhousing wealth-to-income ratio in the population.
A word on the last two targets is in order. Aside from matching the micro-data properties of
liquid consumption, which is the main focus of this exercise, it is also important to gauge how
well the model does in reproducing some aggregate distributional statistics. Given that the focus
of the paper is on the co-existence of assets and debt, the distributional statistics in question
should focus both on the asset-to-income and debt-to-income ratio. There are many ways to
measure these in the data, as there are many possible definitions of wealth. For the purposes of
this estimation, I choose aggregate non-housing wealth and aggregate revolving unsecured debt
(the majority of which is credit card debt), computed in the SCF.
The choice of non-housing wealth as a target, rather than total wealth, is tailored to the
model - which, by design, has no role for a durable asset that provides consumption services.
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One could argue that the fact that households can borrow against their home equity would be
a reason to consider housing as a financial asset too - but in the 2001 data, there is not very
significant evidence of liquidity borrowed against housing, so I claim that treating housing as
primarily a durable nonfinancial asset is the correct approach in the current model context.
Similarly, debt could be measured as unsecured and secured revolving debt - allowing to include
home equity lines of credit - but as the SCF in 2001 does not show significant uptake of such
lines of credit, I use only unsecured debt as a measure.16
There is one other important detail in my calculation of the aggregate target ratios of debt
and wealth to income. Because the income calibration does not represent the top tail of the
income distribution well, the calibrated model will by design have a hard time matching the
average asset statistics for the whole population, and attempting to do so may bias estimates.
To account for this limitation, I map my targets to the income calibration in the following way:
I compute and target in estimation the debt and wealth ratios in the bottom 75% of the 2001
U.S. income distribution, rather than in the whole population. Note that doing so does not
reduce the wealth dispersion in the data all that significantly, so that the average wealth-to-
income ratios are only slightly below what they would be in the population as a whole. For
example, nonhousing wealth-to-income ratio in the whole population is 2.14 - compare that to
the measure for the bottom-75 % of the income distribution used here of 1.69. The difference is
not staggering.17
Finally, as I mentioned in the data section and appendix, the properties of liquid consumption
are sensitive to whether or not food, alcohol and tobacco are included in the calculations.
Specifically, including them increases the average liquid consumption-to-income ratio for the
households, but also decreases the measured volatility of liquid consumption, since food is one
16The uptake of home equity lines of credit (HELOC’s) surged significantly at the end of 2001, as a result
of record-low interest rates and many households refinancing their mortgages, at which time they were offered
HELOC’s for free. This increase, at 30% a year, lasted until 2005 or so, according to the Federal Reserve Board.
The 2001 survey data were thus collected too early to reflect this upsurge.
17The fact that the aggregate targets concern only the bottom 75% of the population may raise the question
of why the other targets are not calculated for the same subsection of the data sample. The reason is that much
of the other analysis is done by subgroup, which are each already located somewhere on a specific subsection of
the income distribution. I have computed all the targets for the bottom-75% however, to find that consumption-
to-income ratios will increase for all the subgroups in question to around 0.70-0.72, while autocorrelation of log
liquid consumption and its standard deviation remain unchanged. Thus, changing the targets to bottom-75%
would actually favor my model, because an increase in average consumption-to-income ratios will produce some
increase in the optimal household liquidity holdings as well.
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of the more invariant expenditure components. The reason I single out this category is that
one is generally able to pay for food, alcohol and tobacco by credit in most places - so it is not
strictly a cash-only good. Yet, survey data overwhelmingly suggest that people choose to pay
for these goods using liquid assets. The question of why is a matter for other research, and there
is a payments literature that addresses it. For my purposes, I let data dictate that food is a
cash good, and thus food is included in the estimation.
In sum, I estimate the five parameters within the model based on nine moments. For each
set of parameters in the minimization process, the procedure solves the model, simulates a 252-
month panel of 100,000 households, computes the moments from it, and compares them with
the moments in the data. The complexity of the problem prevents me from using gradient-
based minimization methods. Thus, for the minimization I use the simplex method of Nelder
and Mead (1965), parallelized at parameter level as suggested by Lee and Wiswall (2007). The
weighting matrix is the identity matrix in the first step, subsequently adjusted to correct for
moments computed with highest variance (those moments that concern the borrower group,
which is smallest in the data, and the wealth-to-income ratio). Data covariances of the moments
in question are not possible to compute in this exercise, since the moments come from two
different data sets.
4.3 Model Fit and Resulting Parameters
In order to assess the fit of the calibrated model, table 9 presents the target moments in the data
and the model. As discussed above, I have 9 targets and 5 parameters: this overidentification
means that I do not have enough instruments to match all of the moments perfectly, but the
closeness of the match allows me to judge the fit of the model. The calibrated model fits most
targets closely. The crucial moments concern the saver and borrower-and-saver groups. For
these, both the liquid consumption-to-income ratio and the volatility of cash-only good con-
sumption are matched quite well, and further, autocorrelation of liquid consumption, measured
across subgroups, is matched nearly perfectly.
The borrower subgroup presents a challenge to the model, as is evident in the targets: the
model does not match the borrowers’ characteristics particularly closely, overpredicting their
liquid consumption-to-income ratio, and significantly underpredicting the volatility of their liquid
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Table 9: Calibration Targets - Data and Model
Target Data Model
Liquid consumption/earnings ratioa: Borrowers 0.719 0.872
Borrowers & savers 0.618 0.597
Savers 0.629 0.613
Autocorrelation (annual) of log liquid consumption: 0.226 0.227
Percent cond’l. st. dev. of log liquid consumptiona: Borrowers 0.201 0.115
Borrowers & savers 0.210 0.207
Savers 0.226 0.227
Mean debt/income ratiob,c 0.058 0.059
Mean wealth/income ratiob,c 1.685 0.607
Notes: (a) The cash-only good series includes food. (b) Wealth is measured as non-housing
wealth; debt is revolving unsecured debt. (c) The moment is computed for the bottom 75%
of the U.S. income distribution.
consumption. The reason is clear. It is very difficult to match the group I call “borrowers” in
the data with that group in the model. In the data, these are households that report having no,
or very little, liquidity. In practice, what the survey data do not measure is holdings of cash, and
there is likely a number of households whose liquidity holdings are much higher than what we
observe, due to it being held as cash rather than in a bank account. In addition, for the 12 months
of expenditures in the data, I only have one annual observation of the household’s asset position
- so I cannot observe the household’s subgroup status changes from month to month. This may
overstate the duration of borrower status for some households, and may thus make their time
series characteristics appear closer to other groups than they are in reality. In the model, the
only households that appear as borrowers are those who get hit by a binding expense shock, so
that they spend all of their money by the end of any given month. This includes two types of
households: those who perpetually hold very little liquidity, so that their liquidity constraint
binds in (nearly) all preference shock realizations, and those who hold sizeable liquidity but
encounter the worst shock realization. The model, due to properties of the income calibration,
will have trouble generating enough of the former - as discussed above, there are not enough
people in the lowest tail of the distribution, relative to the data. The latter group, those with the
worst preference shock realizations, are unlikely to stay in the borrower category for long. This
makes it difficult to measure the time-series characteristics of the borrowers’ expenses over time:
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the former group dominates, and their expenses are nearly constant, so volatility is understated
relative to the data; their liquid expense-to-income ratio is likely to be overpredicted as well.
The two final targets concern the average debt-to-annual-income and wealth-to-annual-
income ratios. The debt-to-income ratio is matched nearly perfectly, but the average wealth-to-
income ratio is underpredicted significantly. The performance of the model along the average
asset dimension is not surprising. There is only one parameter that largely determines how
much wealth and how much debt there is in the economy: the discount factor β. This one
parameter cannot match both moments - the higher the value of β, the higher the wealth in
the economy, but necessarily, the lower the debt. Further, it is a common problem in this
type of heterogeneous-agent models that the wealth distribution is difficult to match well with
simple asset structures like in my model. Models that try to get the distribution of wealth to
be disperse enough have to be explicit about the richness of features of the U.S. asset market,
including the Social Security system, business and home ownership, high and stochastic capital
gains, and others (see, for example, Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull, 1997). These features are clearly
beyond the scope of this model, nor are they the focus of the exercise. Therefore, in this context
it is acceptable that by construction, the model matches the amount of debt in the economy
well, and average wealth not nearly as well. The results of interest here, which concern liquid
assets, will not be impacted by the total amount of wealth, largely nonliquid, accumulated by
the model households.
Table 10 presents the resulting parameterization. The discount factor is equivalent to 0.9234
in annual terms. The parameters of the utility function are in themselves of interest and a
contribution of this paper: to date, to my knowledge, in liquidity-based models, these parameters
were estimated in deterministic cash-in-advance models only. α, the weight on cash-only goods
in the CES utility function, is 0.58, which once again confirms that they are an important part
of a household’s expenditures - not surprising given that I consider payments to mortgages and
household repairs under this heading. The parameter that measures elasticity of substitution
between cash and credit goods is approximately ν = −1.5, that is, cash and credit goods are
compliments, rather than substitutes. Comparing these with other estimates from the literature,
Chari et al (1991) and others after them find an estimate for α of around 0.62, which is very close
to my estimate and this is encouraging; however, their ν tends to be on the order of 0.79-0.84.
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Table 10: Calibration
Parameter Value
Interest rates rs 0.0033 (annual rs = 0.04)
rb 0.0107 (annual rb = 0.14)
Risk aversion/IES δ 2.0
Discount rate β 0.99338 (annual βa = 0.92339)
Consumption aggregator α 0.58377
parameters ν -1.49669
Preference shock process: ρz 0.46287
AR(1) with discretization σz 0.48449
It appears, then, that idiosyncratic uncertainty makes a big difference for the substitutability
parameter and, in my view, brings it closer to what one might intuitively expect.
Finally, the estimates of the preference process are of importance, since this study presents
a new attempt to quantify unobservable idiosyncratic uncertainty from microdata specific to
liquidity needs. Notice that the role of these parameters is central in determining the properties
of liquid consumption in the model: persistence of consumption is related to persistence of
the preference shocks, and its variability - to the volatility of shock states. The estimated
monthly AR(1) parameter on log(z) is 0.46. The AR(1) specification is flexible, encompassing
anything from a very persistent shock process to an i.i.d. one. The high outlier preference shock
states are likely to be extreme events, as consumption patterns in the data would suggest, so
we would expect their persistence to be low. The estimate of 0.46 suggests that the extreme
realizations of the shock are relatively rare and rarely persist for more than one period. The
standard deviation of the shock process is estimated at 0.48. As partial insurance is always
optimal and agents prefer to smooth consumption, it is intuitive that the observed consumption
process “mutes” the variability of the underlying shock process, and it is interesting to note that
variability of the shock itself is more than twice the variability of observed liquid consumption.
Based on the analysis of the calibration targets, the parameterization described above pro-
duces a realistic economy in terms of its mapping to the data; the moments that are missed in
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Table 11: Results - Subgroup Size (Percent)
Data Model
Borrowers 5.2 1.4
Borrowers & savers 27.1 19.7
Savers 67.7 78.9
estimation are missed for reasons external to the model and by design, and with consequences
not central to the puzzle in question, which is discussed in the next section.
5 Results
As mentioned before, I left the magnitudes of interest for answering the central question of this
paper untargeted in calibration. The model is mapped to the data based on quantities unrelated
to the results of interest, and this freedom allows me to measure exactly how much of the puzzle
is accounted for by the liquidity need hypothesis with preference uncertainty as the main driving
force. To measure this, I focus on the size of the subgroups (borrowers, borrowers-and-savers,
and savers), as well as liquidity holdings that each subgroup optimally chooses.
Table 11 gives the size of the three subgroups in the data and the model. In the model,
the size of the borrower-and-saver group is 19.7% of the population, while in the data, it is
27.1%. Thus, the model accounts for 73% of the puzzle group. It overstates the size of the saver
group, at 79% relative to the 68% in the data, and understates the size of the borrower group,
putting it at 1.4% instead of 5.2%. The intuition for these facts is similar to that discussed in
the calibration section. First, income calibration understates the amount of uncertainty that
households face in the data, and is likely to underpredict how many people choose to borrow as
a result - which leads to the underprediction of the numbers of both borrowers and borrowers-
and-savers in the model. Second, the model’s borrower group consists only of those who are
constrained at the end of the month, while in the data, there may be some households who have
very few liquid assets throughout the month, not captured by the model by construction.
In order to measure liquid assets, I have to define what the money holdings observed in
the data are. As discussed, a cross-sectional average of money holdings in the SCF reflects
an average monthly amount of money in the bank accounts, since households are continually
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Table 12: Results - Liquid-Asset-to-Income Ratio, Average During Month, Median Household
Data Model Model/Data
Borrowers 0.10 0.39 3.90
Borrowers & savers 0.79 0.43 0.55
Savers 0.88 0.49 0.56
interviewed throughout the month. This cannot apply to the borrower group, however: it is not
likely that households in this group truly never hold liquid assets during the month, given their
average liquid spending documented above, so these must be households observed at the end of
the month who have drawn down all of their liquid assets, most likely due to binding resource
constraints. Since in the model I observe money holdings at two points during the month, rather
than just one, I study average monthly money holdings for all households. However, I separate
out the borrower group by looking at end-month liquid holdings, since in the model, as in the
data, no household will have zero liquid assets at the beginning of the month.
In table 13, I present liquid asset holdings relative to income by subgroup, in the data and in
the model. I focus on the median household in both the model and the data, since, for reasons
having to do with the difficulty of matching the upper tails of both the income and wealth
distributions, the model is biased from the outset toward medians, rather than means. The last
column translates the model’s results into per-dollar amounts relative to the data. In particular,
for the median household in the puzzle group, the model matches 55 cents of every dollar held
by the median puzzle household in the data. This number is 56 cents for the saver group. Notice
that for the borrowers, the model matches 390% of the money holdings in the data. The reason,
again, is that borrowers in the data are households we observe with near-zero liquidity holdings.
Yet, in the model, nobody chooses to have zero liquid holdings, because of Inada conditions and
optimality of self-insurance. Thus, this number in the data is actually hard to compare to the
model - I present the result for completeness only.
6 Discussion of the Results
There are several ways in which the current results on the size of the borrower-and-saver group
and liquidity holdings may be seen as a lower bound. First, as discussed in the calibration
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section, the properties of the income calibration, necessarily restricted by the lack of micro-
data of sufficiently low frequency, are likely to understate the size of the puzzle group in the
model, as well as, possibly, liquidity holdings. Second, money demand can be directly affected by
aspects not captured by the model; one that comes to mind is the minimum balance requirement
on checking accounts. Many checking accounts allow their holder to avoid sizeable fees by
maintaining a minimum balance in the account at all times. Anecdotally, this minimum balance
requirement can go as high as $1,000 or more. I do not account for such a minimum balance
requirement in the model, in large part because I do not have data on what these requirements
might be and what the share of the population is that has them. If, however, it is assumed that
many or all checking account balances have some minimum positive amount that they need to
exceed, then the total amount of liquidity that I can account for will rise by the share of the total
account balance that such a minimum balance captures in the data.18 The argument would,
of course, be more nuanced given that one would have to consider when it may be optimal to
dip below the minimum balance for a household that finds itself in the borrowing-and-saving
situation. But if this situation is temporary, this channel may still increase the puzzle household’s
liquidity demand in the model, and it will certainly increase the demand of saver households.
Third, and most importantly, the model currently captures only one channel that gives rise
to precautionary liquidity demand, namely, preference uncertainty. There is, of course, a second
source of uncertainty in the model - income uncertainty - but it plays a role only in generating
disperse nonliquid asset holdings, as households insure against this shock by saving or borrowing
in the asset b. The reason for the lack of a link between income uncertainty and liquidity demand
is that it is costless in the first subperiod to acquire additional liquidity from a credit card in the
event of a low income shock. Yet this link may be important: even predictable expenses may
require precautionary money holdings. For example, if one should lose one’s job and paycheck,
one still needs to pay the mortgage each month. And in reality, unlike in the model, getting liquid
assets on the spot from any source other than the bank account is actually very costly. The most
available method, at least in 2001, was a cash advance from a credit card, which would incurs
18For example, for a median household with a $3,000 liquidity holding, if the minimum balance on its account
were $1,000, then that $1,000 would be unusable for daily expenses, assuming the household wants to avoid fees,
which can be sizeable. Thus, I would only have to account for $2,000 in this account. Since my model matches
55% of the total median balance, which translates to roughly $1,650, with the minimum balance requirement, I
would be capturing 82.5% of “operational” liquidity balance of such a household.
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a withdrawal fee of several percent of the amount withdrawn, and in addition, would incur an
interest rate much higher than that on credit card purchases (20-25% versus 14%, on average).
Further, this interest would begin accumulating immediately upon withdrawal, without a grace
period. There is also an additional cost which is that if a household has a balance on a credit
card and has a cash advance on it, any payment applied toward the card account goes toward
the lower-interest balance first. Thus, a household without a paycheck would find itself in an
extremely costly borrowing situation if it did not have extra money in the bank. Borrowing from
sources other than credit cards, such as bank loans, is also costly: bank loans and real estate
loans tend to be large lump sums, and involve significant opening/closing costs and time delays.
The idea, then, is that both preference (expense) and income uncertainty, both of which
are present in the data, may easily provide a precautionary motive for liquidity holdings for
most households. I have disentangled the influence of one. Extending the model by adding a
direct cost of transfers from consumer credit to liquidity, and recomputing and recalibrating
it to quantify how all the costs of borrowing affect demand for liquidity, is a worthwhile but
difficult exercise, in that the model thus extended becomes much more difficult to solve due to
additional non-convexities and an expansion of an already large state space. Thus, it is beyond
the scope of this paper to implement such an extention. But I did compute two-period versions
of the benchmark and the extended models, and this exercise suggests that income uncertainty
adds to liquidity demand significantly (in the example, which is only indicative, it increased by
30-50% relative to the benchmark case, depending on the exact asset specification). Thus, it
should be emphasized that the liquidity hypothesis may not just be a strong explanation for the
puzzle, but indeed most of the explanation.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a new explanation for the credit card debt puzzle, the phenomenon that
many U.S. households who revolve expensive credit card debt also keep significant low-return
liquid assets in the bank, without using them to pay off the debt. I examine the hypothesis
that there is a significant share of household expenditures each month that cannot be paid
by credit card, so that households need to keep liquidity in the bank at all times to pay for
these expenditures. It is crucial that there is a significant unpredictable component to these
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expenses, so households not only hold the money for pre-committed expenses, but also have
an additional stock of liquidity to insure against such unexpected spending needs. Thus, if a
household accumulates credit card debt, but does not have enough money both for its needed
precautionary amount and for debt repayment, it will optimally choose to revolve the debt in
favor of keeping a sufficient supply of liquidity.
The central contribution of the paper is a careful measurement of how much of the puzzle
can be accounted for by the liquidity need hypothesis. After documenting the puzzle carefully
in the data, I pose a dynamic stochastic model of household portfolio choice with two types of
idiosyncratic uncertainty timed in such a way that portfolio decisions have to be made before
spending needs are known. This model successfully accounts, qualitatively, for the salient empir-
ical features of the credit card debt puzzle. The model is then calibrated via a disciplined match
of moments in the data to moments in the model, in such a way that none of the quantities
I target in calibration are related to quantities of interest in accounting for the puzzle. The
parameter estimates are in themselves of interest, providing insights into measuring unobserv-
able idiosyncratic uncertainty and substitutability between cash and credit goods in micro data.
Further, I find that the hypothesis successfully accounts for 73% of the households who revolve
debt while having money in the bank, and for a median such household, it accounts for at least
55 cents of every dollar held in liquid assets. There is a set of compelling reasons to view these
results as a lower bound, so that the hypothesis here presented can be assumed to account for
the majority of the puzzle at hand. Even though there may be households for which alternative
explanations along the lines of time inconsistency or strategic bankruptcy behavior are valid, or
even dominant, for this particular puzzle, I am inclined to conclude that the need for liquidity
in the data is strong enough to account for the majority of it.
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Appendix A Data
A.1 Sample Selection
I use the 2001 wave of the SCF, and the Q2 2000 - Q1 2001 of the CEX, to capture all households
who were interviewed in 2001, and who held credit card debt some time during that period.
In both surveys, I restrict the sample to people of ages between 25 and 64. I drop low-income
outliers below a threshold of $200 per month, and also those who are incomplete income reporters
in either survey. Further, I drop those who fail to report valid asset and credit card debt
information (if a CEX household has no such information in its fifth interview, then I drop it
for all the quarters in which it is present). This leaves me with 2,878 households in the SCF,
and 2,743 households in the CEX, with 2,164 of them present for the entire 12 months of the
survey.
A.2 Household Assets and Subdivision of Population into Subgroups
I select the subgroups with the intention of matching their characteristics as closely as possible
in the two data sets. In the SCF, liquid asset holdings are measured in detail, as are credit card
debt data. The SCF asks the following questions about credit card balances that I use here:
• “After the last payment [on your credit card accounts], roughly what was the balance still
owed on these accounts?”
• “How often do you pay off your credit card balance in full?” Answer choices are: Always
or almost always, Sometimes, Almost never.
From the first question, I can clearly distinguish revolving balance from the new purchases
that appear before the bill is paid. As an aside, note that it is well-known that debt information
tends to be underreported in the SCF (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999), but this serves to my
advantage, since at worst it understates the size of the puzzle in the data, or the amount of debt
that households hold. I use the second question to select only habitual credit card debtors to be
in the puzzle group, that is, those who answer “Sometimes” or “Almost never”; of all households
who report to have positive credit card debt at the time of the interview, 77% are in this group.
Liquid assets are defined as all household checking and savings account balances, and I also
include brokerage accounts, because in the CEX there is no way to separate them out. Credit
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cards that I consider are bank-type and store credit cards, that is, those that allow to revolve
debt.
In the CEX, credit card balance information is collected in the second and fifth interviews,
and in the fifth interview, households are also asked the amount they paid in the last year in
finance charges on credit cards (distinct from late fees). The relevant questions in the CEX are:
• “On the first of this month, what was the balance on your credit card account(s)?”
• “What was the amount paid in finance charges on all credit card accounts over the last 12
months?”
As is clear from the first question, it is harder to distinguish revolving debt from new pur-
chases in the CEX, but I can do so fairly reliably using the finance charge question. In the CEX,
credit cards are defined similarly to the SCF, as store and bank-type cards that allow debt to
be revolved. Selecting a threshold of $500 for revolving debt, and assuming it is revolved for
a year, I take all households who paid an average of 14% APR on this balance as credit card
revolvers. (The 14% interest rate is the SCF-reported interest rate paid on average on credit
cards, shown in the text). Again, liquid assets are savings, checking and brokerage accounts.
In both surveys, those who report credit card debt above $500 and liquid assets below $500
(and those who are habitual debtors in the SCF, or paid positive finance charges in the CEX)
are then put in the subgroup “debtors”. The remaining subgroup - those with little non-habitual
debt or no credit card debt - are “savers”.
A.3 Separating Consumption Goods into Groups by Payment Method;
ABA Survey of Consumer Payment Preferences
In looking at household consumption in the CEX, it was necessary to separate consumption into
goods that people have to pay for with liquid instruments (cash, check, debit card) and goods
that can be paid by either credit or liquidity. I separate household expenditures in the CEX into
“cash-only goods”, “cash-or-credit goods”, education and durables. I separate out education and
durables because expenditures for these goods occur rarely, while consumption is continuous but
not measured through expenditure (see Krueger and Perri, 2003). Thus, studying volatility of
expenditure on these goods is uninformative. This is true of cash-or-credit goods to some extent
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Table A.3.1: ABA Survey: Most Used Payment Method by Bill Type
Check, cash,
Bill type direct debit Debit Card Credit Card
Rent or mortgage 99.4 0.3 0.4
Loan or lease 98.2 1.0 0.8
Insurance 96.2 1.2 2.6
Childcare, tuition 91.8 2.2 6.0
Utilities 95.0 2.5 2.5
Charity contributions 96.0 1.3 2.7
Memberships, subscriptions 85.2 3.1 11.7
also, since they include many semi-durable items, such as clothing; it is important that the point
of this exercise is not to compare volatilities across good groups.
To accomplish the separation, I relied on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Payment Preferences
conducted by the American Bankers Association and Dove Consulting. This survey is not
representative of all U.S. households, but is the only up-to-date survey that studies consumer
payment methods. The sample that it does study consists of people with access to internet, so
arguably, these are households who have the broadest payment options, and thus it should give
a fairly accurate idea of payment methods used for most common good groups. In the survey,
consumers are asked how they pay for certain types of goods and services, as well as at certain
types of stores. Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 present a summary of all results from the survey that
pertain to consumer choice of payment methods. The questions were all phrased in the same
way: “When you make purchases at [type of store], which method of payment do you use most
often?”, and “When you pay for [type of bill], which payment method do you use most often?”
Expenditures on food, alcohol and tobacco deserve special attention. In separating out the
cash-only category, it was important to make a decision regarding goods that consumers mostly
choose to pay by liquid instruments, even though credit cards may be an option. For example,
it is clear from the survey, as well as other general payment method studies by the Federal
Reserve, that households tend to prefer to pay for essentials, such as food, by a check, debit
card, or cash. However, in most supermarkets, credit cards became an option in the mid-1990’s;
a more questionable category is food in restaurants, since many smaller fine restaurants opt not
to accept credit cards. A second issue is that in the CEX, these good groups are goods for
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Table A.3.2: ABA Survey: Most Used Payment Method by Store
Store Cash or check Debit Card Credit Card
Grocery store 45.4 35.7 18.9
Gas station/convenience store 34.1 26.8 39.1
Department store 27.6 26.4 46.0
Discount store/warehouse club 43.4 27.2 29.4
Drug store 47.3 29.7 23.0
Restaurants 42.3 23.4 34.3
Fast food 85.6 7.8 6.6
Transit system 81.4 8.6 10.0
Table A.3.3: Goods Categories for CEX Analysis
Good group Components
Cash-only goods Rent, mortgage, utilities, property taxes, insurance, household
(paid by check, debit, operations, babysitting, public transportation, health insurance;
cash) food in and out, alcohol, tobacco.
Cash-or-credit goods Apparel, entertainment, gasoline, medical services, medical equipment,
prescription drugs, reading, personal care, membership fees, funeral
expenses, legal fees, etc.
Durables Households furnishings and major appliances, vehicle purchases
Education Tuition and fee expenses, textbook purchases
which the question in the survey asks the household to remember a monthly average spent over
the last three months, rather than an accurate expenditure in each month. This would tend to
depress the measure of consumption volatility of whichever group food is included in. A further
discussion of this group is in the text.
The resulting categories are presented in table A.3.3.
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Appendix B Computational Algorithm
The problem is divided into an outer maximization, which corresponds to the first-subperiod
household problem, and an inner maximization, which is the second-subperiod choice of con-
sumption given preference shock realization. As the inner maximization has only one control
variable, it is solved by approximating the first-order-condition. Value function iteration can be
used instead, and produces the same results. The algorithm is as follows.
1. Discretize the state space: grids are made on m, b, c1 and a. Shock spaces are discrete, as
described in calibration methodology. I use linear interpolation for approximating value
functions in between grid points.
2. Guess the value function, V 01 (st, zt−1, at). For the first-order condition in c2t, numerically
compute the derivative of the value function with respect to liquid holdings:
V 01m(st, zt−1, at) =
V 01 (st, zt−1, at +∆)− V
0
1 (st, zt−1, at)
∆
3. Inner Maximization. Given the above guess, solve the second-subperiod problem for each
state (st, zt,m2t, b2t, c1t) in two steps:
- Assume the constraint does not bind so that µ(st, zt,m2t, b2t, c1t) = 0. Then solve
the first-order condition with µt(·) = 0:
ztu2(c1t, ztc2t(x2t)) = βEst+1|stV
0
1m(st+1, zt, at+1) + µt(·) (17)
The right-hand side is computed using the numerical derivative of the previous guess
of the value function, interpolated between points on the m grid.
- Check that the constraint is satisfied, that is c2t < m2t. If it is, record the solution
as (c∗2t, µ
∗) = (c2t, 0).
- If the constraint is not satisfied, set the constraint to bind: this gives c∗2t = m2t. Then
use (17) to solve for µ(· ). Record the solution as (c∗2t, µ
∗) = (m2t, µ).
4. Outer Maximization. For each state (st, zt−1, at), perform a maximization via discretiza-
tion on (m2t, b2t), to maximize the value function at that point. Denote the maximized
value V 1(·).
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5. Convergence check. If V 1(· ) ≈ V 0(· ) for all states, then we have the solution. Else, update
the value function’s new guess as the last iteration’s computation, V 0(· ) = V 1(· ) along
with its numerical derivative, and restart at step 3.
The algorithm further employs monotonicity and concavity properties of the value function,
as well as, periodically, Howard’s acceleration algorithm between the maximization steps. The
algorithm converges in around 19-25 iterations, depending on the parameters.
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